A Study of Internationalism and Multilateral Corruption
‘Although there will always be inequalities amongst the nations of the world; international cooperation through multilateral organisations and agreements allows for more prosperity and stability for everyone.’
The source presents a positive, and at that, a highly favourable perspective on the idea of internationalism as a force for global cooperation, especially within the context of multilateral or supranational organisations. Its tone airs somewhat on the side of optimism, almost to a point of blissful idealism, and it seems to suggest a rather hopeful vision of an internationalist world whose nations are politically, economically, and militarily interconnected. In the source, the author argues that institutions and treaties that take multilateral and, by association, bilateral approaches to issues of international relations ultimately work to create a global political climate that is fundamentally more prosperous, more stable, and more secure for all nations of the world, despite any inequalities that may exist between individual nation-states. The source suggests that this attitude of global cooperation is best promoted and facilitated by supranational unions that can allow all nations to air their individual grievances, resolve issues diplomatically, and work towards compromises that are in their mutual interests.
The author seems to acknowledge that internationalism, especially in the context of multilateral organisations and supranational unions, often fails to work in the national interests of individual players. However, the crux of their argument surrounds the idea that the pursuit of national interest is inherently short-sighted and irresponsible because, to all intents and purposes, one country’s national interest will always conflict with the interests of others – unilateral pursuits can easily lead to the domination of one power over another. Instead, the author suggests that national leaders and state governors look instead to the fulfilment of mutual interests, cooperating with their neighbours to reach compromises that are inherently better for all parties. In this way, nation-states can avoid conflict and will instead be encouraged to resolve issues diplomatically, taking various different perspectives into account.
It is interesting to note that the author makes no mention of any specific organisations and inquires merely on the basis of theory. The source argues only for the merits of internationalism as a theory; that the application of its principles to the workings of geopolitics is, at best, a fundamental pillar of promoting world peace and at worst, simply better than the alternative. The source does not take a stance on the effectiveness of present multilateral and supranational institutions like the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; it simply argues that the world is more stable, more prosperous, and more peaceful with these organisations than without. The alternative perspective to the author’s argument surrounds such ideas as nationalism and unilateralism; the geopolitical doctrine of one-sided action by a nation-state government so as to pursue national interests. An author in disagreement with the author of the source might argue that by allowing individual powers to act unilaterally, to hold their interests as the fundamental pillar of their foreign policy, and to work to accomplish whatever is best for their people, global stability will naturally arise so long as every nation looks after themselves and their own affairs. They might argue that multilateral organisations and supranational unions exist only to impede upon the sovereignty of individual nations and that, more often than not, they upset the balance of global peace and prosperity more than they uphold it.
The blissful idealism of the perspectives reflected in the source makes it easy to accept this rather quixotic vision of the embrace of multilateral organisations as a final and necessary step towards the attainment of some ill-defined internationalist utopia which will, at last, bring about lasting world peace. Yet, the source seems to concern itself merely with matters of theory and ultimately fails to present internationalism in a pragmatic light; to effectively apply its principles to a complex, ever-changing modern world. While internationalism may certainly seem appealing in theory, the manifestation of its principles in the form of multilateral organisations is preposterously ineffective at accomplishing the goals it sets out to achieve, often providing a rather inconsequential, almost laughable presence that is easily disregarded by great powers acting unilaterally, or in some cases, working to further aggravate and destabilise an already tense situation. An important question must therefore be raised as to the effectiveness and legitimacy of these organisations; to what extent do they truly work in the interest of the international community?
Perhaps the most colossal failure of multilateral organisations, specifically the United Nations, has been its chronic inability to effectively accomplish its goals of global peace, security, and prosperity in both the long- and short-term contexts. In fact, the intervention of the United Nations in foreign conflicts – whether directly (through peacekeeping) or indirectly (through economic sanctions) – has continuously worked to destabilise conflict regions and exacerbate already dire political, economic, social, or security situations, One needs to look only to the pages of recent history to see this ineffectiveness in action, the most fervent example of which is the case of post-war decolonisation. Decolonisation is a process whereby the colonial empires of Europe, specifically France and Great Britain, were dismantled in a global effort led by the United Nations (but in reality, by the United States and the Soviet Union) to ‘ensure the right to self-determination of all peoples.’ While this concept certainly seems noble in theory, decolonisation in practice proved to be a chaotic mess of haphazard independence movements that left unstable post-colonial regimes in its wake.
One particularly extreme instance of post-colonial instability is the case of Rhodesia in southern Africa, now the nation of Zimbabwe. Its predecessor state, Southern Rhodesia, was a self-governing colony of the British Empire with a small white settler minority and a native black majority, as did many African states at the time. While the colony never had a formal South African style Apartheid system, racial segregation was commonplace, and thus, power was largely concentrated in the white minority. Nonetheless, in the post-war years, Southern Rhodesia grew into an economic powerhouse that spawned a booming manufacturing sector, a strong agricultural sector, and flourishing iron and steel industries. Despite its racial downfalls, the ‘breadbasket of Africa’ brought relative economic prosperity and political stability to its people.
In the 1970s, however, amid pressure from the United Nations to decolonise, the British administration was forced to pull out of Rhodesia and immediately establish black majority rule. The backlash from the ruling white minority culminated in Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 under the administration of Prime Minister Ian Smith. The new Republic of Rhodesia faced unanimous criticism from the international community, so much so that no sovereign state in the UN would formally recognise it as a country. Three years later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 253, imposing crippling sanctions on the fledgling nation in an effort to indirectly force Smith’s administration out of power. Despite this, Rhodesia held out as a sovereign state for thirteen years (courtesy of unofficial support from Apartheid South Africa, Portuguese Mozambique, and the white minority in Angola) and fought the brutal Rhodesian Bush War against the Soviet-backed Zimbabwean African People’s Union and the Chinese-backed Zimbabwean African National Union. It cannot be understated that in these turbulent years, Rhodesia consistently defended its sovereignty, even in the face of international pressure, constant guerilla warfare, and social unrest from within and without. Eventually, however, Rhodesia would crumble under the pressure and the resulting power vacuum would allow the dictator Robert Mugabe to rise to power. Mugabe’s brutal thirty-seven-year rule would see the new Republic of Zimbabwe plunged into economic ruin due to hyperinflation, the expulsion of white farmers, and widespread government corruption, bringing instability and chaos to the once-prosperous nation.
Had the United Nations recognised that decolonisation was a gradual process, and had they allowed for a smooth transition of power from the stable British colonial administration to a democratic, independent Rhodesian/Zimbabwean government, it is likely that Southern Africa would be considerably more stable, prosperous, and peaceful than it is today. However, because the UN pressured the colonial administration to decolonise without taking the necessary precautions, and because the Security Council took such aggressive stances against the independent Rhodesian state in response to their unilateral attempts to maintain the colonial social order, modern-day Zimbabwe is a nation of economic turmoil, constant racial violence, frequent social unrest, and a major recipient of international aid; all in the name of some reckless, ambiguously defined pursuit of self-determination.
Contrast this with the case of Apartheid South Africa. Issues of segregation and racial conflict were just as, if not more prevalent in South Africa than they were in Rhodesia. However, South Africa’s status as an independent state made it largely immune to the UN’s hostile decolonisation measures and thus did not face the same international aggression that Rhodesia did. While South Africa did indeed face immense international condemnation in the form of economic sanctions, the involvement of the United Nations in South African affairs was essentially minuscule when compared to its actions against Rhodesia. As a result, South Africa saw a bloodless revolution in the 1990s that democratically allowed for the rise of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress, marking the end of the Apartheid era. While a case can certainly be made questioning the effectiveness of subsequent ANC administrations, it cannot be denied that the establishment of black majority rule in South Africa was considerably more peaceful, effective, and stable than the comparatively violent transition of power seen in Rhodesia; a point that can be directly attributed to the UN’s limited involvement in South African affairs.
Perhaps the UN’s greatest failure in effectively and peacefully decolonising colonial states is the case of the Belgian Congo in central Africa, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the 1960s, growing social unrest courtesy of homegrown Congolese nationalist movements, as well as immense diplomatic pressure from the United Nations, forced Belgium to give up its claim to the Congo. Independence was forcefully achieved in June 1960 despite the fact that virtually no preparations had been made on issues of federalism, tribalism, and ethnic nationalism. It is important to note that it was in the mutual interest of both Belgium and the independent Congo to conduct a smooth transition of power, albeit for different reasons – Belgium attempted to establish indefinite white minority rule and the independent Congo was still heavily reliant on colonial institutions.
International pressure resulted in a hurried decolonisation process which left the independent Congo government woefully unprepared to deal with these increasingly pressing issues and the country soon descended into chaos. Tensions reached a boiling point when black soldiers in the Force Publique, the colonial gendarmerie, mutinied against their white officers with support from the new central government under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. When the rebellion spread to the capital Leopoldville, Belgium intervened by deploying their own forces to quell civil unrest and coordinate the mass exodus of refugees. Just a few days later, amidst the chaos, the mineral-rich province of Katanga unilaterally declared independence from the new Congo state, motivated by racial and class differences, conflict of interest regarding colonial governance, and a sense of Katangese nationalism that created a willingness to keep profits from the mining industry within Katanga rather than sharing with the rest of the Congo. The situation in Katanga soon descended into chaos with the separatists under Moïse Tshombé engaging in violent clashes with the central government.
In response to the crisis, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 143, which pressured Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo; conveniently ignoring the dire circumstances which prompted Belgian intervention in the first place. It also created the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC); a UN peacekeeping force deployed to manage the situation in Katanga and facilitate the withdrawal of Belgian troops, despite their immense efforts to maintain law and order, protect civilians, and ensure a smooth transition of power. The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld insisted on the neutrality of UN peacekeepers, though it would soon become evident that the ONUC was less an effort to keep the peace and more an effort to enforce the peace – which in effect meant the forceful imposition of UN interests upon an unstable state. The peacekeepers were initially welcomed by both the central government and the Katangese separatists; the central government appreciated its efforts to remove Belgian forces (despite the government’s own ineptitude in handling the situation) and the separatists believed the UN would help them fight for independence. When neither of these things occurred, the central government turned to support from the Soviet Union and the separatists hired mercenaries to take their independence by force, thus introducing new third parties and further destabilising the situation.
One year into the campaign, the ONUC’s claim to impartiality was subverted when the Security Council issued Resolution 169, permitting ONUC forces to capture and detain all foreign mercenaries. Because the Katangese separatist force was largely comprised of mercenaries, this was, in effect, an act in support of the central government, and thus, the UN’s false façade of neutrality had fallen. A failed attempt to capture Katangese mercenaries during Operation Morthor escalated into a fire-fight and the ONUC had effectively instigated a civil war. During the Siege of Jadotville, a small contingent of Irish-UN ‘peacekeepers’ was attacked and overrun by Katangese forces, marking the first act of aggression specifically against the United Nations. In December 1961, the UN pressured the separatist leader Tshombé to concede Katanga’s claim to independence and join the new, but unstable federal Congo state. Following a series of rebellions, ethnic conflicts, and political instability, a former army colonel named Joseph-Désiré Mobutu conducted a coup d’état with American support, establishing the new state of Zaire with himself as the sole authoritarian leader. The people of Zaire would suffer under Mobutu’s brutal reign until his overthrow in 1996, sparking the First Congo War. A disappointing lack of reform in the new Congolese state subsequently led to the Great African War; a trans-continental conflict involving nine African countries, twenty-five armed groups, foreign intervention, and some 5.4 million deaths, making it the deadliest conflict since the Second World War. While tensions have since subsided, fighting still continues in many parts of the country and the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains one of the poorest and most unstable countries in the world; a terrible tragedy that could have been avoided had the United Nations taken a more careful approach to decolonisation, respected Belgium’s unilateral efforts to maintain law and order, maintained the impartiality of their ‘peacekeepers’, and allowed for the smooth transition of power. Instead, the UN recklessly intervened in the internal affairs of an already unstable post-colonial state, violating its sovereignty and sparking a brutal continental war that destroyed any possibility of restoring the region’s political, economic, and social stability. Millions upon millions of lives were lost as a direct result of the UN’s incompetence, lack of foresight, and carelessness; lives that very well could have been saved had the UN simply respected the sovereignty of the Congo and allowed for unilateral efforts to ensure the smooth transition of power.
If the United Nations, as well as similar multilateral organisations, were truly committed to the righteous ideals of world peace that they so hypocritically call their own, and if their interests were genuinely aligned with those of the people whose nations they destabilise, devastate, occupy, and topple, the merits of internationalism may very well outshine its downfalls. However, the UN has, time and time again, proven itself entirely incompetent in dealing with the varied issues and concerns of the international community; issues that were historically very easily resolved in the absence of UN meddling. Internationalism and multilateral organisations, in their short-sighted, disorganised pursuits have made the world (specifically Africa) an increasingly fragile, violent, and abhorrent place; and has, candidly, not earned the attention it receives from the international community at present. A global shift towards unilateralism is in the utmost interest of all the nations of the world; and a return to nationalist principles should be embraced to the fullest possible extent if mankind is to see a future of peace, order, and prosperity.
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